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Abstract 
Economists use various models to explain why it is that firms are capable of pricing 
above marginal cost. In this paper, we will examine two of them: the Cournot and Bertrand 
duopoly models. Economists generally accept both models as good explanations of the 
phenomenon, but the two models contradict each other in various important ways. The puzzle is 
that two inconsistent explanations are both regarded as good explanations for the same 
phenomenon. This becomes especially worrisome when the two models are offering divergent 
policy recommendations. This report presents that puzzle by laying out how the two models 
contradict each other in a myriad of ways and then offers five possible solutions to that puzzle 
from various economists, philosophers of science, and philosophers of economics.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
One of the primary aims of scientific study is to explain phenomena. We aim to answer 
why-questions that crop up when we examine the world around us. The field of economics is no 
different in this respect to all the other sciences. Why does the price of a good increase? Why 
does one country grow at a faster rate than another? Why does an increase in the money supply 
correlate with an increase in the price level? These are the types of questions that require 
explanations for answers.  
In this paper, I will examine one specific why-question within economics: why can firms 
price above marginal cost? Economists have many answers, but we will examine two of them in 
particular: the Bertrand and Cournot duopoly models. The economic community seems to regard 
both as good answers to the general why-question, but they cannot both be true, because they 
contradict themselves in important ways, including in the policy recommendations that they 
offer. This is the puzzle that will be the center of our inquiry. In Chapter 2, I will give an 
explanation of each of the two models that we will be examining and point out how they 
contradict. In Chapter 3, I will present some brief philosophical background on the concept of 
scientific explanation before giving a precise form of the puzzle that we will seek to solve by 
offering five possible solutions to the puzzle. Chapter 4 will include some concluding thoughts. 
Before embarking on that, I want to offer a few words on how this sort of interdisciplinary 
discourse is a possible useful venture.  
 1.1 - Economists are Philosophers (and vice versa) 
The way that the typical university is organized creates a sharp divide between 
disciplines. The economists stay in their department, while the philosophers stay in their corner 
of campus. This physical and administrative divide should not seep into our academic work, 
though. Both fields have plenty of things to offer the other. I will focus here on what some 
philosophical tools can offer for answering an economic question, but that does not mean that 
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economics has nothing to offer philosophy.1 Both fields ought to look at the other for possible 
insight.   
The separation from philosophy is a peculiar historical fact. Many of the great minds who 
first developed the field were primarily philosophers. Sir William David Ross argued that “it 
must be remembered that in economics, as in so many other fields, Aristotle was almost the 
earliest worker.”2 Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Karl Marx all did important 
work in philosophy and economics.3 The field of economics began with important contributions 
from the world of philosophy. Over time, the divide between the two fields began to widen. A 
typical view is that economics deals with hard data and facts, while philosophy deals with the 
world of values and that these two worlds must not touch, lest they dilute the power of each 
other. In economics, the distinction between valueless, positive economics and value-laden, 
normative economics is drawn early and often. Economists qua economists, we are told, are to 
avoid the use of values in their positive studies.  
This divide ought not be as sharp today, though. Philosophers are beginning to look at the 
possibilities of using large amounts of data and economic-style experiments to test their theories. 
Economists, on the other hand, are increasingly recognizing the need to properly assess the 
foundations of their field, especially when it comes to its methodology and the fundamental 
purpose of their scientific endeavor. These are questions that philosophers of science have been 
asking. Further, with the growing influence of fields such as welfare economics and happiness 
economics, the relative importance of positive and normative economics has shifted. 
With the collapse of the financial system in 2008, economists hit a perceived nadir as a 
group of intellectuals. The influential magazine, The Economist, wrote after the downturn that 
“of all the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have burst more spectacularly than the 
reputation of economics itself.”4 Large numbers of economists seemed to be left largely 
blindsided by the sudden downturn with no real explanation for its causes and certainly no 
                                                
1 Game theory and public choice economics both offer great analytical tools, especially for political philosophers. 
Experiments about choice being conducted by experimental economics can offer insight into philosophy of action 
and philosophy mind. These are only a couple possibilities open to philosophers from the work of economists. 
2 Ross (1949). p. 213.  
3 Smith developed a theory of ethics and a philosophy of language. Mill is a foremost author on utilitarian ethics. 
Hume did influential work on induction and famously awoke Immanuel Kant from his intellectual slumber. Marx 
wrote extensively on political philosophy.  
4 What Went Wrong with Economics. (2009, July 18). The Economist. 
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prediction of it happening before it did. This has caused more economists to begin considering 
the underlying foundation of their field, which is precisely what philosophers have been doing. 
Economists have had to turn to assess the metaphysics (the theory of what the fundamental 
nature of being is) and epistemology (the theory of knowledge) behind their ideas. Philosophers 
of science have been asking these questions and can help provide the answers to some of these 
fundamentally economic questions. This intellectual interaction between the two fields can offer 
benefits for both sides. 
Chapter 2 - The Models 
 2.1 - Perfect Competition 
When economists want to examine market structures, they often start with the perfect 
competition model, which is an idealization of actual market structures. By using the results of 
the model and discovering how the real world differs from the perfect competition model in 
important ways, economists are able to learn things about the actual economic world. Here are 
the basic assumptions of the perfect competition model. 
1) The number of buyers and sellers of the good is large enough that no single actor 
in the market has an impact upon the price. All firms are price takers.  
2) Products within the market are homogenous. The goods sold by different firms 
are perfect substitutues.  
3) All actors in the market have perfect information about price, quality, and other 
facts about the market and the goods on the market. 
4) There are no barriers to entry to and exit from the market. 
Some models invoke additional assumptions, but these four are the standard minimal 
assumptions and suffice for our purposes.  
For our purposes the most important result is that under perfect competition, price is 
equal to marginal cost. Let me illustrate how economists get to this result in two ways. The first 
is by focusing on the price taking behavior of firms under perfect competition. We assume that 
the sole objective of firms is to maximize profits. In order to do this, firms must price where 
marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. This is the necessary and sufficient condition for 
maximizing profits. In perfectly competitive markets, marginal revenue implies that price equals 
marginal cost due to the price taking behavior of the firms.   
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Let us now examine how this is explicated graphically, by examining the long-run 
equilibrium of the perfectly competitive market. 
 
Figure 1 
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of pefect competition. The left graph shows the 
relationships between price and quantity at the level of the firm. The right graph shows the 
relationships between price and quantity at the level of the whole industry. The market price (Pe) 
is set by the interaction of supply and demand at the industry level. By taking the price from the 
industry on the right and applying it to the individual firm graph on the left, we see that the 
demand curve for the individual firm is perfectly elastic5 at the market price. This is what 
economists mean when they say that firms are price takers, as in the first assumption. Individual 
firms have no ability to change the price. If they raise it above Pe, they will sell no goods as they 
are undercut by their many competitors. If they lower it below Pe, they will be making a loss and 
go out of business. The firm has to take the price of Pe. As well as marking out the firm’s 
demand curve, Pe allows us to identify the firm’s marginal revenue (MR) curve. This is 
important, because the profit maximizing condition for a firm is to set marginal cost (MC) equal 
to marginal revenue. At this point, the firm gains more profit than at any other point.  
                                                
5 Elasticity is a measure of how responsive one economic variable is to a change in another economic variable. In 
this case, we are looking at demand elasticity, which measures how responsive the quantity demanded is to a change 
in the price. Demand is said to be perfectly elastic, if and only if any change in the price will cause quantity 
demanded to go to zero.  
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The final curve to look at is the average cost (AC) curve. The demand curve is tangent to 
the AC curve at the lowest point of the AC curve. This is another important consequence of the 
perfectly competitive market. If price were greater than average cost (which would happen if the 
supply curve was shifted to the left), then individual firms would be making profits. Because 
entry and exit into the market is completely free, if individual firms are making profits, then 
more firms will enter the market to gain profits. This will push the industry supply curve to the 
right, which will push the marginal cost curve downwards until it is at the minimum point of the 
average cost curve. If price was less than average cost (which would happen if the supply curve 
was shifted to the right), then the exact opposite process would take place; firms would freely 
exit the market as they make losses until the marginal cost curve is tangent to the average cost 
curve. This result means that in perfectly competitive markets, firms make no economic profits 
in the long run—any profit opportunity is swept away by the free entry of new firms onto the 
market—and marginal cost is equal to price.  
Again: of these, the important result is that under perfect competition, price is equal to 
marginal cost, because price is equal to marginal revenue and profit maximizing firms set 
marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. 
The problem is that when economists observe all the firms in the real world, they observe 
that there exist some firms that are pricing above marginal cost (and, thus, making a profit). We 
see companies like Airbus, Boeing, and Microsoft capable of making these types of profits. 
Companies are charged under anti-trust legislation due to monopolistic or oligopolistic 
behaviors. What is happening in these cases? That is the phenomena that needs to be explained: 
some firms are capable, contra the implications of perfect competition models, of pricing above 
marginal cost. 
To explain why a result of the perfect competition doesn’t show up in the real world, we 
need to relax alternative assumptions, and then examine which of the resulting models best 
matches data from the real world. Economists do just that with two different and (importantly, 
for our purposes) incompatible models, the Cournot and Bertrand models. 
 2.2 - Cournot Model 
The Cournot model was developed by Antoine Augustin Cournot in 1838. His model 
contains many of the same assumptions as the perfect competition model (homogenous product, 
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firms maximize economic profits, firms do not cooperate, perfect information) with a few 
notable exceptions. Firstly and most importantly, firms are not price takers, because there are not 
a large number of firms in the market. Cournot drew up this model by examining a duopoly, a 
market with only two firms.6 Due to the fewness of the firms, firms have market power, which 
allows them to have some degree of control over the market price. Secondly, the number of firms 
is fixed, so there is no free entry and exit. In fact, there is no entry or exit at all.  
Thirdly (and crucially for distinguishing it from the Bertrand model), firms compete in 
quantities. Firms are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the market demand curve (which 
relates total quantity on the market to price), of their firm’s cost curve (which relates their 
quantity produced to their total cost), and of their competitor’s cost curves (which relates their 
competitor’s quantity produced to their competitor’s total cost). Given this knowledge, each firm 
examines how much quantity their competitors will produce. With the remaining or residual 
demand, that firm then acts as a monopolist and sets marginal cost equal to marginal revenue. 
The equilibrium quantity is set on the duopoly model by the intersection of the two firms’ 
reaction functions, which relate how much one firm will produce to how much the other firm 
will produce. These reactions functions are plotted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
The basic assumptions of the Cournot model are:7 
                                                
6 Specifically, Cournot was examining a market for spring water that was dominated by two producers.  
7 Carlton & Perloff (2005). Ch. 6.  
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1) The number of buyers and sellers of the good is small enough that individual 
firms in the market can have an impact on the price. All firms are to some 
extent price makers. These firms compete on quantities. 
2) Products within the market are homogenous. The goods sold by different firms 
are perfect substitutes.  
3) All actors in the market have perfect information about price, quality, and other 
facts about the market and the goods on the market. 
4) There are total barriers to entry and exit to the market. No new firms may enter 
and no firms may exit. 
The results of the Cournot model are that the quantity produced falls somewhere between 
the amount produced by a monopolist and the amount produced under perfect competition. 
Similarly, the price is set between the price set by a monopolist and the price set under perfect 
competition. Specifically, price is set above marginal cost in relation to the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (H) and the elasticity of the demand curve, according to the following 
equation.8 
€ 
P −MC
P =
−H
ε
 
P = price; MC = marginal cost; H = Herfindahl index; ε = elasticity of demand 
The Herfindahl index is equal to the sum of the squares of all the market shares. For 
instance, if a market is under a duopoly and each firm controls 50% of the market, then 
€ 
H = 0.52 + 0.52 = 0.5 . This means that the ability for firms to price above marginal cost is 
directly tied to the concentration of a market, as represented by their respective market shares, 
which provides them with market power.  
According to Cournot, the ability of firms to price above marginal cost is explained by 
the fewness of firms that leads to restricted output and hence market power. 
 2.3 - Bertrand Model 
The Bertrand model was developed by Joseph Louis François Bertrand in 1883 in his 
review of Cournot’s book. Bertrand also begins by relaxing the first assumption of the perfect 
competition model. In contrast to Cournot, the Bertrand model has the duopolistic firms 
                                                
8 Lewis and McAfee (2012), Ch. 17.1. This assumes that the marginal cost is the same across firms in the market. 
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competing in prices. The firms choose the price that would maximize their profit. Given only this 
change in the assumptions of the perfect competition model, how do firms choose where to 
price? They price immedeately below their competitor. Since consumers will buy the good with 
the lower price, the firm with the lower price will take the entire market at the highest price 
possible. 
In response, the other firm will price directly below their competitor. They will then 
recapture the entire market and maximize their profit. In response to that, the original firm will 
price just below this new price to recapture the market and maximize their profit. This process 
continues between the two firms until price is equal to marginal cost. With only two firms, the 
Bertrand model tells us that we will reach the perfectly competitive outcome, in which price is 
equal to marginal cost.  
So, how then does Bertrand explain the ability for firms to price above marginal cost? 
The model relaxes another important assumption of the perfectly competitive markets: product 
homogeneity. This can be thought of in two ways. The first way is that the two goods might be in 
actuality the same thing, but that advertising and brand names causes consumers to value them 
differently. A good example can be found in the pharmaceutical aisle of your local grocery; you 
will find generic acetamatophin right next to Tylenol. Both bottles contain exactly the same 
chemical, but the bottle of Tylenol will be more expensive than the generic acetamatophin. The 
second way is that there are some important quality differences between the goods for which 
people will pay more. Consumers will pay more for oranges from one company, if their oranges 
are of higher quality.9  
The basic assumptions of the Bertrand model are:10  
1) The number of buyers and sellers of the good is small enough that individual 
firms in the market can have an impact on the price. All firms are to some 
extent price makers. These firms compete on prices. 
                                                
9 This distinction is not as clear as I am making it here. Tylenol might be importantly different from generic 
acetaminophen just because it is a brand name. This might give a placebo effect that makes Tylenol more effective. 
Further, brand names in themselves can be valuable because of the social status that it brings to have brand name 
goods over generic goods or to have the goods that famous people are advertising. These sorts of considerations 
might make these categories collapse into one.  
10 Carlton & Perloff (2005). Ch. 6.  
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2) Products within the market are heterogenous. The goods sold by different firms 
are not perfect substitutes. Advertising and quality differences can affect the 
market. 
3) All actors in the market have perfect information about price, quality, and other 
facts about the market and the goods on the market. 
4) There are total barriers to entry and exit to the market. No new firms may enter 
and no firms may exit. 
According to Bertrand, the ability of firms to price above marginal cost is explained by 
product differentation, whether perceived by the consumers or actually in the quality of the 
product. 
 2.4 - How the Models Contradict 
The Cournot and Bertrand models contradict each other in three main areas: their 
assumptions, their economic results, and their policy implications. Let us examine each area one 
by one. 
 2.4.1 - Assumptions 
We will examine each assumption of the two models individually. Below are the first 
assumptions of the Cournot and Bertrand model rewritten for clarity’s sake. 
Cournot-1: The number of buyers and sellers of the good is small enough that individual 
firms in the market can have an impact on the price. All firms are to some extent price makers. 
These firms compete on quantities.  
Bertrand-1: The number of buyers and sellers of the good is small enough that individual 
firms in the market can have an impact on the price. All firms are to some extent price makers. 
These firms compete on prices.  
This is a subtle, yet important distinction between the two models. The phrase “compete 
on quantities” or “compete on prices” seems a bit clunky, but it describes well what is happening 
in the two models. Price and quantity are inextricably linked by supply and demand effects. The 
difference between the two models is which of the two variables the firms directly determines 
and which they indirectly determine through their choice. One is a choice variable; the other is 
determined by what the firms set their choice variable at.  
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Under Cournot, the firms directly determine the quantities that they will produce. Firm 1 
chooses q1 and firm 2 chooses q2, qi representing the quantity produced by the ith firm. Using 
these numbers, q1 + q2 = Q, representing the total market quantity. This quantity, Q, enters the 
market as the supply. Through interaction with the demand curve, a market price, P, is indirectly 
determined. 
Under Bertrand, the firms directly determine the prices that they will set from their 
goods. Firm 1 chooses p1 and firm 2 chooses p2. Consumers demand goods based upon these 
prices and the market quantity is determined indirectly by the interaction of the demand curve 
with these prices.  
One simple way to think about the distinction is to examine a demand curve graphed in 
price-quantity space as shown in Figure 3. The Cournot story is that the x-axis variable, quantity, 
is the independently chosen variable that determines price. The Bertrand story is that the y-axis 
variable, price, is the independently chosen variable that determines quantity.  
 
Figure 3 
The important part of this for our purposes is that these two claims of the models are 
inconsistent. They cannot both be true. Cournot claims that firms compete on quantities. This 
implies that firms do not compete on prices, which directly contradicts the claim of Bertrand. 
The first assumptions of the two models cannot both be true.  
Cournot-2: Products within the market are homogenous. The goods sold by different 
firms are perfect substitutes. 
Bertrand-2: Products within the market are heterogenous. The goods sold by different 
firms are not perfect substitutes. Advertising and quality differences can affect the market. 
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The contradiction is most obvious in this assumption, where Bertrand assumes the direct 
negation of Cournot. Cournot assumes that the goods sold by different firms are perfect 
substitutes. Bertrand assumes that the goods sold by different firms are not perfect substitutes. It 
is impossible for both of these statements to be true.  
Cournot and Bertrand share equivalent third and fourth assumptions. 
 2.4.2 - Economic Results 
There is one obvious way that the two models contradict each other when it comes their 
economic results. Cournot and Bertrand disagree about what conditions are necessary for the 
market to reach the perfectly competitive result.  
Cournot requires that many firms are required to reach the competitive result in the same 
way that the perfect competition model requires many firms. To see this, recall the equation 
given by the Cournot model:  
€ 
P −MC
P =
−H
ε
 
As the number of firms in an industry increases, H, the Herfindahl Index, get smaller and 
smaller. As H decreases, the gap between the price and marginal cost decreases until the market 
reaches the perfectly competitive outcome.  
Bertrand only requires two firms for the market to reach the perfectly competitive result, 
as we saw above in the description of the model itself.  
The two models contradict each other on what is the minimum requirements for a market 
to attain the perfectly competitive result. Bertrand states that a market with two firms is enough; 
Cournot states that a market with two firms is not enough. Cournot states that many firms are 
needed; Bertrand states that many firms are not needed. The two models’ economic results are 
inconsistent.  
 2.4.3 - Policy Implications 
This is where the puzzle attains some important “real world” implications. Along with 
other purposes, these models are to be used to offer recommendations for how to formulate 
public policy. This makes it even more important to find what the explanation is for the ability of 
firms to price above marginal cost. Bad policy can create harms to real people in the real world. 
It is no longer just an academic exercise; here, the economist bears a special type of burden, 
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because their work is so closely intertwined with public policy. What we find, though, is that 
these two models diverge in their policy recommendations, as well. Let us examine a series of 
papers that point out important divergences between the policy implications of the Cournot and 
Bertrand models. 
Eaton and Grossman (1986)11 – The paper begins with the simplest possible model of 
international trade. This model will start with no Cournot or Bertrand assumptions. It contains 
two countries with a single firm in each country that produces perfectly substitutable goods that 
are sold in a third country. The two firms compete in a duopolistic market. In this model, if there 
is no domestic competition, then trade policy becomes that same as industrial policy. The 
objective of the government in enacting policy is to maximize the sum of the home-firm’s profit 
and their own tax revenue. The model will assume that the foreign government enacts no trade 
policy and examine what the best policy for the domestic government is.  
Formally, this is presented as follows. The output (and thus, exports) of the home firm is 
denoted by 
€ 
x  and its cost function is denoted by 
€ 
c(x), where 
€ 
c'(x) > 0. Uppercase letters denote 
the corresponding quantities for the foreign firm with 
€ 
C'(x) > 0 . Pretax revenue of the home and 
foreign firms are given by the functions 
€ 
r(x,X) and 
€ 
R(x,X) , respectively, which satisfy the 
conditions that 
€ 
r2(x,X) ≡
∂r(x,X)
∂X ≤ 0 
€ 
R1(x,X) ≡
∂R(x,X)
∂x ≤ 0 
These conditions state that an increase in the output of the competiting product lowers the 
total revenue of each firm. Total after-tax profits of the home and foreign firms are given by 
€ 
π = (1− t)r(x,X) − c(x)  
€ 
Π = R(x,X) −C(x), 
respectively. In the first equation (for the home firm) 
€ 
t  denotes the ad valorem output tax 
placed upon the good. The domestic firm’s conjecture about the foreign firm’s output response to 
changes in its own output is given by the parameter 
€ 
γ . The corresponding parameter for the 
foreign firm is 
€ 
Γ. Given these, the Nash equilibirum quantities, given the level of home country 
policy intervention are determined by the following first-order conditions: 
                                                
11 Eaton & Grossman (1986).  
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€ 
(1− t)[r1(x,X) +γr2(x,X)] − c'(x) = 0
R2(x,X) +ΓR1(x,X) −C'(X) = 0
 
With this set-up, Eaton and Grossman prove that a positive output or export tax (t>0) can 
yield higher national welfare than laissez-faire if the home firm conjectures a foreign change in 
output in response to an increase it its own output that is smaller than the actual response.12 
Intuitively, this is because the policy intervention allows the domestic firm to act not as a typical 
competitor, but as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its competitor. The authors then examine 
what the optimal policy would be given Cournot assumptions and given Bertrand assumptions. 
Under Cournot, each firm conjectures that the other firm will hold their output fixed in 
response to changes in their own output. In the formal language, this means that 
€ 
γ = Γ = 0. Given 
this, Eaton and Grossman find that an export subsidy raises domestic welfare by transferring 
industry-wide profits to the domestic firm. This finding is also consistent with Brander and 
Spencer’s 1985 paper.13 What they find is that an export subsidy allows the domestic firm to 
precommit to a higher level of output, making that firm an effective Stackelberg leader. This 
transfers industry profit to the domestic firm. The domestic firm benefits at the expense of the 
foreign firm. Under Cournot assumptions, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy. 
Under Bertrand, each firm conjectures that the other firm will hold their price fixed in 
response to changes in their own price. Given this, Eaton and Grossman find that the optimal 
policy is to implement an output or export tax. The logic is similar to the Cournot case in that the 
tax allows the domestic firm to act as a Stackelberg leader and precommit to a higher price. In 
contrast to the Cournot-based export subsidy, this tax causes price to rise and quantity to 
decrease. It also increases the profits of the foreign firm by relieving the duopolistic rivalry.  
Cournot advocates for a subsidy; Bertrand advocates for a tax. The outcomes of these two 
policies are divergent, as well. The subsidy under Cournot simply moves profits from one firm to 
the other. The tax under Bertrand causes prices to rise, quantities to fall, and profits of both firms 
to increase.  
Suetens and Potter (2007)14 – When a market is dominated by two firms, the duopolists 
will sometimes explicitly agree to form a cartel or make some sort of agreement to achieve 
monopolistic profits. When this type of explicit agreement is made illegal or would make the 
                                                
12 Ibid, p. 388-389. 
13 Brander & Spencer (1985). 
14 Suetens & Potters (2007).  
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companies look bad, the duopolists might still engage in tacit collusion. They will take certain 
informal actions, such as foregoing opportunities to undercut their competitor, that maintain the 
duopoly. The two firms tacitly agree to play a specific strategy.  
Suetens and Potter use past data from people interacting in pre-arranged Cournot and 
Bertrand settings in an effort to determine which setting is more likely to produce tacit collusion 
between the competitors. Before directly examining the data, they calculate a theoretical index of 
the scope for tacit collusion. This is referred to the Friedman index, as it comes from James 
Friedman.15 The index is simply a ratio between the theoretical gains from cooperation and the 
theoretical gains from defection, written as 
€ 
πJPM −πNash
πDefect −πJPM
, where 
€ 
πJPM is the profit earned under 
joint profit maximization or collusion, 
€ 
πNash is the profit earned under the Nash equilibrium, and 
€ 
πDefect is the profit earned by defecting. For the various experimental arrangements, the authors 
calculate the theoretical benchmarks for price, quantity, and profit. Using these numbers, they 
calculate the Friedman index. What they find is that the Friedman index is consistently greater in 
the Cournot arrangements than in the Bertrand arrangements. They have a priori reason to think 
that tacit collusion is more likely under Cournot than Bertrand.  
In examining the data, the authors develop an new index that is similar to the Friedman 
index to examine the tendencies towards tacit collusion. This new index is required in order to 
make use of the data from the experiment rather than using the theoretical benchmarks. The 
degree of collusion of oligopoly k in round t is defined as:  
€ 
ρkt =
x kt − xNash
xJPM − xNash
. 
This index is calculated with both 
€ 
x kt  representing the average price and representing the 
average profit, so that for each oligopoly k and for each round t there are two values of 
€ 
ρkt , one 
using average price and one using average profit. If 
€ 
ρkt = 0 , then oligopoly k behaves like an 
average oligopoly, according to the Nash equilibrium in round t, because the numerator will be 
equal to 0. If 
€ 
0 < ρkt ≤1, then oligopoly k in round t is collusive. If 
€ 
ρkt < 0 , then oligopoly k in 
round t is more competitive than the Nash equilibrium. That is because the index is a ratio 
                                                
15 Friedman (1971).  
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between the actual gap between price/profit and the Nash equilibirum and the theoretical gap 
between price and profit. 
Using this index, they find: 
€ 
ρ =
1
NT ρktt=1
T
∑
k=1
N
∑ .  
This is a simple sum of all the 
€ 
ρkt  values across all oligopolies k and all rounds t. The 
€ 
ρ  
value for the Cournot and Bertrand experiments is then calculated. Their experimental findings 
contrast with what the Friedman index predicted. What they find is that the 
€ 
ρ  values are 
consistently greater for the Bertrand experiments than the Cournot experiments. Bertrand 
markets, therefore, contain more tacit collusion between firms.  
Figure 4 displays the results from the experiments. The bolded titles along the first 
column differientate between the different data sets. For each data set, the authors provide eight 
€ 
ρ  values: one under Cournot using price for x, one under Cournot using profit for x, one under 
Bertrand using price for x, one under Bertrand using profit for x, and those four duplicated for 
two slightly different types of experiments that were done, BASIC and EXTRA. Under EXTRA, 
the participants were given more information before making their price or quantity decisions. N 
is the number of experiments that were done in each data set. For each data set a p-value is 
provided to show the statistical significance of the difference between the Cournot and Bertrand 
outcomes. 
This finding has important policy implications. If it is the case that tacit collusion is more 
prevalent under Bertrand than under Cournot, then that will make a difference for anti-trust 
policy. If Bertrand is the explanation for the ability of firms to price above marginal cost, then 
more policy must focus on the possibility of our oligopolists colluding in more subtle ways. If 
Cournot is the explanation, then it would be a waste of resources to focus so much on tacit 
collusion.  
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Figure 4 
Ghosh and Mitra (2010)16 – Mixed markets are markets where private firms, who are 
assumed to be maximizing profits, compete with public firms, who are assumed to be 
maximizing welfare. Introducing public firms often results in economic outcomes that can be 
very different from what the standard models predict. Ghosh and Mitra introduce a public firm 
into the Cournot and Bertrand models and examine how the two models differ. Their models are 
                                                
16 Ghosh & Mitra (2010).  
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of duopolies, where a single private firm competes with a single public firm. Here are their 
findings: 
1) The public firm’s output is strictly higher in Cournot than in Bertrand, whereas the 
private firm’s output is strictly lower. 
2) The profits of both firms are strictly lower in Cournot than in Bertrand. 
3) Welfare is strictly higher in Bertrand than in Cournot as long as the private firm’s 
price is weakly lower under Bertrand. 
4) If you have a linear demand structure, then consumer surplus is strictly higher under 
Cournot than under Bertrand.  
All of these findings have important implications for policy surrounding the creation of 
public firms. Let us examine the defense of their first finding. In Figure 5, we have the reaction 
functions of the public firm, WW, and the private firm, PP, plotted in (q1, q2) space, where q1 is 
the quantity produced by the public firm and q2 is the quantity produced by the private firm. The 
intersection of the two curves at point C is the Cournot equilibrium. The shaded area represents 
possible points of Bertrand equilibrium.  
 We know that 
€ 
∂W (q)
∂q1
= 0 for all q on WW and that 
€ 
∂ 2W (q)
∂q12
< 0. Given these facts, it 
follows that any q that satisfies 
€ 
∂W (q)
∂q1
> 0  must lie to the left of WW. We have a similar line of 
logic for the private firm. We know that 
€ 
∂π 2(q)
∂q2
= 0  for all q on PP and that 
€ 
∂ 2π 2(q)
∂q22
< 0 . Given 
these facts, it follows that any q that satisfies 
€ 
∂π 2(q)
∂q2
< 0  must lie above PP. With those two 
results, it follows then that 
€ 
(q1B ,q2B )  must lie in the shaded region to the left of WW and above 
PP. Since for all q in the shaded region, 
€ 
q1 < q1C  and 
€ 
q2 > q2C , then 
€ 
q1B < q1C  and 
€ 
q2B > q2C . 
Therefore, the public firm produces a higher quantity under Cournot, whereas the private firm 
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produces a higher quantity under Bertrand. 
 
Figure 5 
 Given this result, we have differing implications for best use of public firms. Cournot 
would imply that public firms are better used where you want them to take a more central role in 
the market, whereas Bertrand would imply that public firms are better used where you want them 
to play a more supplementary role along with already existing private firms, because the public 
firm’s output is higher under Cournot. The second finding has important implications for how to 
best fund a public firm. Bertrand would predict that a public firm would be more capable of 
funding itself, whereas Cournot would predict that a public firm might need funding in the form 
of taxes to make sure that the public firm stays afloat, because profits are strictly higher under 
Bertrand.  
Chapter 3 - Scientific Explanation and Solving the Puzzle 
So far, I have offered some words about explanations and how Cournot and Bertrand are 
meant to explain the fact that firms can price above marginal cost. Here is where I hope to make 
the concept of explanation more precise. To do this, we will first look at the historical formation 
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and evolution of this concept with the philosophy of science literature before examining how 
these concepts can be specifically applied to explanations within the realm of economics. 
Finally, a precise form of the puzzle will be presented, so that it will be clearer which part of the 
puzzle each of the proposed solutions are attacking. 
 3.1 - Scientific Explanation: The Received View 
 3.1.1 - What are explanations? 
Explanations are answers to why-questions.17 They help clear up matters and remove 
confusion. They serve a pragmatic purpose in helping illuminate facts about certain phenomenon 
that were previously hidden. Importantly, explanation is a separate, though related, goal of 
science from prediction, accuracy, adherence to evidence, etc. Namely, it is possible for a set of 
claims to be true, accurate, and well-supported by evidence, etc., but not to explain. So, what, 
then, makes something an explanation? What is it that makes our answers to our why-questions 
different from other claims made by scientists?  
Any discussion of scientific explanation must begin with Carl Hempel. He argues that 
scientific explanations must meet two systematic requirements.18 Firstly, an explanation must be 
explanatorily relevant. The sentences that are said to describe the phenomenon in question must 
be, in some meaningful manner, relevant to the phenomenon in question. An explanation of what 
stage of the life cycle a star is in based on what constellation it is a part of would fail this 
requirement. Being a part of Ursa Major or Orion has no relevance upon how the star is aging. 
Secondly, an explanation must be testable. Hempel offers a story of an explanation of gravity 
based on a love attraction between masses as being an explanation that fails on this requirement. 
An explanation must meet both requirements to be considered as the explanation for phenomena. 
Explanation, as described by Wesley Salmon, has three intuitive views.19 
1) Explanations show that the phenomenon to be explained was to have been expected. 
2) Explanations show that the phenomenon to be explained was necessary. 
3) Explanations reveal the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. 
                                                
17 Why does the apple fall off the tree? Gravity. Why is the price of eggs lower today than 100 years ago? Decreased 
productions costs. 
18 Hempel (1965). 
19 Salmon (1984). 
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The phenomenon to be explained is referred to as the explanandum. The set of sentences 
that are to explain the phenomenon is referred to as the explanans. For example, one could ask: 
why is it that a dropped apple falls towards the ground? The answer is: because gravity pulls the 
apple towards the Earth. In this case, the dropped apple falling towards the ground is the 
phenomenon that needs to be explained and, thus, the explanandum. Gravity pulling the apple 
towards the Earth explains the explanandum and, thus, the explanans. So, Salmon’s views could 
be rewritten as: 
1) The explanans show that the explanandum was to have been expected. 
2) The explanans show that the explanandum was necessary. 
3) The explanans reveal the causes of the explanandum.  
These three views are very similar, but they have important differences and each has 
important benefits and problems for developing a view of explanation. Let us first, then, examine 
a more formal way to look at explanation. 
 3.1.2 - Deductive-Nomological Method 
For all intents and purposes, the modern discussion around scientific explanation begins 
in 1948 with the publication of “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” by Carl Hempel. In this 
paper, Hempel lines out what is now called the deductive-nomological method. The view had 
begun to be developed by members of the Vienna Circle, a group of prominent philosophers who 
gathered at the University of Vienna, at the turn on the century, but it was Hempel who put forth 
the view in its most precise and succinct form.  
According to Hempel, an explanation is composed of the explanans, which is made up of 
the initial conditions and a covering law, and the explanandum, which follows logically from the 
explanans. This is why we get the name of the method. It is deductive, because the form of the 
explanation is a logically valid argument, and it is nomological, because it requires the use of a 
scientific law. For example:  
(IC): An apple is dropped near the surface of the Earth. 
(L): An object dropped near the surface of the Earth will fall at a rate of 9.8 m/s2 
(C): The apple falls at a rate of 9.8 m/s2 
Jointly the initial condition (IC) and the covering law (L) make up the explanans. Given 
these two sentences, the conclusion (C) follows logically. Thus, we have an explanation for the 
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explanandum. In this way, an explanation takes the form of a logical argument. An explanation is 
a deductive argument where the premises are the explanans and the conclusion is the 
explanandum. 
 3.2 - Explaining Economic Phenomena 
That was a brief look at the history of theorizing on scientific explanation, but it should 
be enough background to allow us to get into the core of assessing what we can do about 
explaining economic phenomena. Economists are constantly seeking after explanation. After any 
economic crisis, the public turns to the professional economists to give them an explanation for 
why the crisis occurred. When the price of an important good goes up, it is economists who must 
explain why that has happened. It should be clear that explanation forms a foundational part of 
the identity and purpose of economists and the study of economics.  
How do we best accomplish this goal? Economists could go the way of Hempel and 
develop economic laws to place within the deductive-nomological method, but economists also 
have a special tool that is used to great aplomb. We have seen how economists have used the 
perfect competition, Cournot, and Bertrand models to explain real-world phenomena. Through 
the use of model building, economists are able to usefully explain real-world phenomena even 
with models that have unrealistic assumptions. In our case, we are able to do so by comparing 
how the results of the model change when we adjust assumptions in an idealized case.    
With a brief background on the concept of scientific explanation, we can now give a 
formal version of the puzzle.  
 3.3 - The Puzzle Made Clear 
(1) Firms are capable, contra the implications of perfect competition models, of pricing above 
marginal cost. 
(2) The Cournot and Bertrand models are inconsistent.  
a. Models are explanatory. 
b. The Cournot and Bertrand models are explanatory of the same phenomenon.  
c. If two models are inconsistent and explanatory of the same phenomenon, then the 
explanans of their explanations are inconsistent.  
(3) The explanans of the explanations offered by Cournot and Bertrand are inconsistent. 
a. At most one of a pair of explanations with inconsistent explanans can be good. 
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b. Only good explanations should be accepted. 
(4) At most one of the explanations offered by Cournot and Bertrand should be accepted. 
(5) Both explanations offered by Cournot and Bertrand should be accepted. 
Premises (1) to (3b) together form an argument for (4). Let us offer some words in 
support for each premise.  
(1) is the explanandum. (2) was shown to be true in section 2.4. (2a) is a widely-held 
belief among the economic community. (2b) is a fact about the two models. (2c) is a fact about 
the nature of explanations. Explanations are arguments from explanans to explanandum. If the 
models are inconsistent and at the same time being used to argue for the same explanandum, then 
the two explanations’ explanans are inconsistent.  
(3) follows from modus ponens from (2), (2b) and (2c). (3a) appeals to scientists’ 
intutition that good explanations are true explanations. If two explanations have inconsistent 
explanans, then at most only one explanans can be true, so at most only one explanation can be 
good. (3b) states a truism that you ought to only accept good explanations. (4) follows from (3), 
(3a), and (3b). (5) is the belief that the economic community holds to. The puzzle is revealed by 
4 and 5 being contradictory.  
 3.4 - Solving the Puzzle 
In order to solve the puzzle, as given a clear form above, we must deny one of the 
premises for the argument for (4) or deny (5). We will examine five different ways to think 
solving the puzzle, each suggesting one of the statements for us to deny. For sake of summary 
and having the information in one place, here is the premise that each solution will attempt to 
deny. 
Van Fraassen: (3a) 
Incommensurate Values: (3a) 
Reiss’ Trilemma: (2a) 
Mäki’s Realism: (5) 
Contextual Application: (2b) 
 3.4.1 - Van Fraassen 
When presented with this sort of puzzle, the first thought of many philosophers of science 
might be the writing of Bas van Fraassen. In The Scientific Image, he describes a scene during 
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his travels along the Saone and Rhone rivers.20 As he is enjoying meal on the terrace of the 
ancestral home of the Chevalier, a shadow from a nearby tower edges closer towards him. His 
sunny dinner spot will soon be very chilly. When talking to some others with him, he asks why 
the shadow will hit the terrace at that time and receives two explanations for the phenomenon. 
The first relates the height of the tower and the angle of the sun to the position of the 
shadow. By describing how tall the tower is and where the sun is, we are able to explain why the 
shadow is now encroaching upon van Fraassen’s meal. In this case, the explanans contains facts 
about the height of the tower, the angle of the sun, and the properties of light. Knowing these 
facts, we have a physical explanation for the shadow reaching the table.  
However, later that evening van Fraassen is given a different explanation for why the 
shadow reaches the table. The tower marks the point where the Chevalier had killed his maid, 
with whom he had been madly in love, after discovering her cheating on him. The tower was 
built to be just high enough that at dusk the shadow of the tower would reach the balcony where 
they had first met and thus started their love together. Knowing these facts, we have a historical 
explanation for the shadow reaching the table.  
Van Fraassen uses this as an example to show that explanations have an important 
pragmatic component. Explanations are answers to why-questions, so therefore the answers must 
in some way rely upon the person asking the question. “Scientific explanation is not (pure) 
science but an application of science. It is a use of science to satisfy certain of our desires; and 
these desires are quite specific in a specific context. […] The exact content of the desire, and the 
evaulation of how well it is satisfied, varies from context to context.”21 In the tower example, we 
have two alternative explanations for a single phenomenon. Both seem to be good explanations. 
How do we choose between them? Well, it depends on the desires and values of the person 
asking the why-question. If they are looking for a description of the scientific reasons, then we 
can appeal to the physical explanation. If they are looking for a description of the history that led 
to this state of being, then we can appeal to the historical explanation. 
This seems like it could parallel our economic puzzle very well. We have a single why-
question—why are firms capable of pricing above marginal cost?—and we have two alternative 
explanations—Cournot and Bertrand—that both seem to be good explanations. The solution 
                                                
20 Van Fraassen, p. 132-134. 
21 Van Fraassen, p. 156. 
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seems simple then. The explanation that ought to be appealed to should be the one that fits to the 
desires of the person asking the why-question.  
When given the puzzle presented here, van Fraassen would reject premise (3a), which 
states that at most one of a pair of explanations with inconsistent explanans can be good.   
The analogy is not as simple, though. In the case of the tower, there is nothing 
inconsistent with the two explanations. It is logically possible for both the scientific and the 
historical explanations to be true and, in fact, it is the case that both explanations are true. In the 
economic case, the two explanations cannot both be true. The two models are inconsistent in 
important ways, as noted above.  
The framework provided by Van Fraassen’s tower example does not fit our economic 
problem. It is not the case that we have two alternative explanations that are consistent from 
which we may simple choose. Instead, we have two alternative explanations that directly oppose 
each other. They cannot both be true, yet both are still widely accepted as being so. I don’t 
believe it is obvious that van Fraassen helps us fully resolve the puzzle. 
 3.4.2 - Incommensurate Values 
We have seen that pragmatics can play an important part in our explanations, because 
explanations are answers to why-questions. It is generally thought that truth is still the ultimate 
criterion for the goodness of explanations, but this could be a mistake. Economists might have a 
more nuanced commitment to truth. Perhaps it is the case that economists are simply left with no 
way to rationally choose between the two models. Economists value, amongst other things, 
models that have true assumptions and models that make accurate predictions. The ideal model 
resembles the actual world to some extent and provides good predictions for how markets will 
function. The problem is that these two aims often conflict, and when they do, neither has lexical 
priority. Economists value these two things incommensurably. There is no way for them to 
compare their valuation of realistic assumptions in the model to their valuation of accurate 
predictions. They are both highly valuable, but incapable of being compared against each other. 
This has an impact on our puzzle, because these two models each satisfy one of these two 
values much better than the other model does. The Cournot model has had the better predictive 
success. The equation that relates the gap between price and marginal cost to the Herfindahl 
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index and the elasticity of demand is a pretty good predictor of how markets actually function.22 
This equation is often used in anti-trust cases, because it can fairly reliably predict how a market 
will look after a merger is allowed to happen.23 The Cournot model satisfies the economists’ 
value for predictive accuracy. 
On the other hand, the Bertrand model seems to have much more sensible and realistic 
assumptions. Namely, competitors will compete on prices in the actual world rather than on 
quantities. When one firm wants to try to take market share from their competitor, it will try to 
do so by lowering its price and making its good cheaper for consumers, rather than adjust the 
quantity produced.24 The Bertrand model satisfies the economists’ value for realistic assumptions 
better than the Cournot model.   
In this way, this solution would also reject (3a), which states that at most one of a pair of 
explanations with inconsistent explanans can be good. Economists have a more nuanced view of 
the truth of their models. The truth of a model has distinct dimensions; it can have more or fewer 
accurate predictions or more or fewer realistic assumptions. Because of this, truth cannot be used 
to decide between models, but rather truth-in-respect-of-predictions or truth-in-respect-of-
assumptions must be used.  
With these two values being incommensurable, economists have no way to rationally 
choose between the two models, so both models end up being accepted, because they both satisfy 
one of the highest values that economists look for in their models. This seems like a good 
description of what economists themselves are doing and how they wriggle out of this puzzle, 
but I am unsure if it is actually a satisfactory way to solve it. 
 3.4.3 - Reiss’ Trilemma 
In Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction, Julian Reiss presents a 
paradox about explaining with economic models. Each statement of the paradox seems plausible 
on its own, but taken together the statements are inconsistent. These are the statements:25 
                                                
22 Hay and Werden (1993): “The Cournot model also is the only one for which it has been shown that price and 
output effects of mergers are well predicted by conventional measures of market shares and concentration.” p. 174. 
23 Carlton and Perloff (2005), p. 613. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines that the Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission use direct the government to first define the market and then to determine whether or not the 
merger will increase or decrease the Hirschman-Herdindahl Index.  
24 Hay and Werden (1993): “The Cournot model has endured a century of criticism. The oldest criticism is that 
setting prices rather than quantities is more realistic,” p. 174. 
25 Reiss (2013), p. 127 
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1) Economic models are false. 
2) Economic models are explanatory. 
3) Only true accounts can explain. 
To resolve the paradox, one must give up on one of the above premises. If we give up on 
premise 2, we have another possible way to solve our puzzle, as premise 2 in Reiss’ paradox is 
equivalent to premise 2a in our puzzle. Reiss’ solution would reject premise (2a), which states 
that models are explanatory. Perhaps the reason that this puzzle arises is because economists 
falsely believe that their models are capable of explaining phenomena in the real world. Models 
might offer tools to develop hypotheses or help us learn modal facts,26 but they cannot explain. 
We are simply mistaken when we use the Cournot and Bertrand models to try and explain why it 
is that firms can price above marginal cost. 
It certainly seems, though, that models do in fact explain. It is true that models achieve 
other goals, but they are also used to explain phenomena in the world. To save this premise in the 
paradox, we must show that one of the other two is false. I will offer some of my own 
speculations on the first and offer thoughts from Robert Sugden on the third. 
I want to offer a brief sketch of a possible story about how we can think of economic 
models being true. I am borrowing a concept from Christian theology related to Biblical 
inerrancy and apply it to assessing the truth-value of models. One theory of Biblical inerrancy 
states that what it means to say that the Bible is inerrant is to say that everything that the Bible 
teaches is true.27 It is the case that the Bible gets certain facts, such as specific numbers, 
incorrect, but those statements are not teachings of the Bible. Everything that the Bible teaches is 
in fact true, if it is the case that the Bible is inerrant.  
Similarly, one way of assessing the truth-value of a model is assessing whether or not 
what the model teaches is true or false. In this way many economic models would be true. 
Schelling’s model of racial segregation teaches us that it is possible for racial segregation to not 
be the result of racism; Akerlof’s model of the market for lemons teaches us that incomplete 
information can cause a market to collapse; Cournot and Bertrand teach us how it is possible that 
                                                
26 In fact, Reiss himself believes this is one important function of model building. 
27 The “Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy” from 1978 states that “Scripture is without error or fault in all its 
teaching.”  
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firms can come to price above marginal cost.28 In this way, we have a plausible way to show that 
economic models can in fact be true. We thereby have reason to deny premise 1 in Reiss’ 
paradox 
  We also have reason to deny premise 3 in the paradox. Robert Sugden claims that 
explanation is possible with unrealistic models. Let R be a regularity and F be a causal factor. 
Sugden argues that we use models to explain with the following form of argument:29 
1) In the model world, R is caused by F. 
2) F operates in the real world. 
3) R occurs in the real world. 
4) Therefore, there is reason to believe that in the real world, R is caused by F. 
The logical inference to 4 is an inductive one. In the same way that we might observe a 
number of cities in the US and then induce facts about cities that we have not observed, models 
allow us to observe a number of possible worlds and then induce facts about the real world. “The 
gap between model world and real world can be filled by inductive inference. […] [Models] 
describe credible counterfactual worlds. This credibility gives us some warrant for making 
inductive inferences from model to real world.”30 The basic idea is that the real world is the most 
complex model there is; it includes every single fact. We are able to induce from simple models 
to more complex models (in much the same way that we did from perfect competition to our 
duopoly models). If you continue that inductive chain from possible worlds to the actual world, 
you are able to use the false models to explain things about the real world. In this way, false 
accounts are capable of explaining.  
Reiss’ paradox is a difficult one for those working in economic methodology. Reiss 
himself concludes that “the rational response to the paradox is to remain baffled.”31 At minimum, 
we have good reason to think that it is not the second premise of the paradox that needs to be 
thrown out, but rather one of the other two. This leaves us with our original puzzle still standing 
unscathed. 
                                                
28 Notice, in defense of Reiss claim about the importance of models for discovering modal facts, that these examples 
are all modal claims. 
29 Sugden (2000). p. 21. 
30 Sugden (2000). p. 31. 
31 Reiss, (2013). p. 141. 
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 3.4.4 - Mäki’s Realism 
Uskali Mäki is the foremost proponent of realism in philosophy of economics. He argues 
for a realist approach to models in that he argues that models can possibly be true. He defends 
what he calls a functional decomposition approach. “It is a decomposition account since it relies 
on splitting models into bits and pieces rather than dealing with them as undifferentiated wholes. 
It is a functional account in that it is based on attributing distinct functions to those bits and 
pieces.”32 His formulation of models is as follows: 
Agent A uses object M (the model) as a representative of target 
system R for purpose P; addressing audience E; at least potentially 
prompting genuine issues of resemblance between M and R to 
arise; describing M and drawing inferences about M and R in 
terms of one or more model descriptions D; and applies 
commentary C to identify the above elements and to align them 
with one another.33  
 The functional part of Mäki’s story is represented by the model being used for some 
purpose P and addressing some audience E. The decomposition part of the story is represented 
by the commentary C, which is used to identify the relevant parts of the model and the respect 
and the degree to which those parts are supposed to resemble the system R. Models are made up 
of various parts and each part has a different function. Mäki argues that one of those functions is 
to be the primary truth bearer. The model-purpose and model-audience relations are important 
pragmatic parts that alone cannot constitute truth. The model-system resemblance relation is key 
to truth, but as soon as you recognize that, you must introduce the purpose and the audience into 
the equation, because they are the ones that determine which parts of the model are important for 
assessing that resemblance relation. In this way, truth about models has both pragmatic and 
ontological constraints.  
According to Mäki, we can assess the truth-value of a model. In this way, Mäki’s solution 
would reject premise (5), which states that both explanations offered by Cournot and Bertrand 
should be accepted. To solve the puzzle, the economist must use his theory of the truth-value of 
models to assess which is actually true. By examining the component parts of the two models 
                                                
32 Mäki, (2013). p. 9. Italics in original. 
33 Mäki (2009). p. 5. 
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and seeing how they resemble the world, economists should be able to decide which one is 
actually true or if they are simply both false. If one of them were true, Mäki would say that 
economists should accept that one and reject the false one. Until that work is done, the puzzle 
will remain. 
 3.4.5 - Contextual Application 
This solution might be referred to as the economist’s solution, as it is the one most often 
appealed to by the economist. The economist says that we are simply thinking about how to use 
these models in the wrong way. We are not seeking to explain some single phenomenon out in 
the world, but rather a variety of different phenomena. There are a huge number of markets in 
the world and these all behave in slightly different ways. What the economist does to assess a 
single market is to find the model that seems to best fit that specific market and then use that 
model to learn things about that market.  
In this way, we observe specific firms that have the ability to price above equilibrium and 
we have different ways to explain why these specific firms are able to do this, namely our 
Cournot and Bertrand explanations. How do we determine which is the best explanation? We 
look at the specific properties of that market and see which model best maps onto those 
properties. In this way, the contextual application solution would reject premise (2b), which 
states that the Cournot and Bertrand models are explanatory of the same phenomenon. 
Economists, according to this solution, are not about answering this broad question: why is it that 
firms can price above marginal cost? Instead, they are about answering a myriad of specific 
questions about why firm X can price above marginal cost. 
This seems a temptingly simple and obvious solution, but I want to press on it by means 
of analogy.34 Imagine that I create a Perfect Goldfish Model. This model has a number of 
assumptions about the life of a goldfish that allows the goldfish to live a full, prosperous, and 
fully efficient life. We assume that there are no cats around; we assume that the goldfish bowl is 
perfectly clean; we assume that the goldfish is fed the perfect food source. In our Perfect 
Goldfish Model, goldfish perform optimally, but we observe in the real world that there are 
goldfish that do not live a full, prosperous, and fully efficient life. Many die. We are left with a 
why-question that deserves an explanation: why is it that goldfish die? 
                                                
34 I am thankful to Graham Leach-Krouse for offering this insight. 
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In an attempt to explain why these goldfish are dying early, we might relax some of the 
assumptions of our Perfect Goldfish Model to observe how this changes our outcome. We relax 
the no cat assumption and develop the Shmournot Goldfish Model. What we see now is that 
goldfish die; in fact, they are killed by the cats! We have an explanation for our real-world 
phenomenon: cats kill the goldfish. But, we have a competing model, the Shmertrand Goldfish 
Model, which relaxes the assumptions that the goldfish bowl is perfectly clean. Again, we 
observe that goldfish die when their bowl gets very dirty. We have another explanation for our 
real-world phenomenon: dirty goldfish bowls kill the goldfish.  
How does this help us answer our why-question? What have we learned about why it is 
that goldfish die? Well, it seems that we have learned about certain cases of goldfish death. We 
can explain certain cases where cats are nearby or cases where the bowl gets dirty, but we seem 
to be missing a larger question about why it is that goldfish even die in the first place.  
To make this clearer, let us make an important distinction between types and tokens. This 
is an important ontological distinction between something more general and specific instances of 
that general thing. A famous example to demonstrate the difference comes from Sacred Emily, a 
poem written by Gertrude Stein. She writes: 
“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.” 
One might ask after seeing this line of the poem: how many words are in this line? There 
are two answers. In one sense, there are three words (‘rose’, ‘is’, and ‘a’). In another sense, there 
are ten words. In the first sense, we are counting the word types, whereas in the second sense, we 
are counting the word tokens. Types are general categories; tokens are specific instances of that 
type.  
We can enumerate a few more examples to make the distinction clearer. There is the type 
human being, as well as each individual token in the form of you, the reader, your parents, and 
other human beings. There is this one type, but billions of tokens. There is the type NBA 
franchise, as well as a number of individual tokens in the form of the Memphis Grizzlies, Atlanta 
Hawks, and the other franchises. There is the type planet, as well as individual token in the form 
of Earth, Mars, and the other planets that orbit the Sun. 
To apply it to our analogy, there is the type goldfish dying, as well as individual token of 
various goldfish dying. What our Shmournot and Shmertrand models seem to be doing is 
explaining the existence of certain specific tokens of goldfish dying, but it failing to grasp at the 
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type. It cannot explain why it is that goldfish die (or, to put it another way, why goldfish are 
mortal). The same, I argue, is true of our Cournot and Bertrand models. They are potentially 
capable of offering explanations for tokens of firms being capable of pricing above marginal 
cost, but are incapable of offering an explanation for the type firms being capable of pricing 
above marginal cost. 
The response from an advocate of this solution might be to simply shrug their shoulders 
and carry on doing their economic study. Economics should not care about explaining these 
esoteric types and instead look to explain the tokens that we can directly observe and interact 
with. These are the things that policy makers are looking for us to offer answers about. These are 
the loci of our academic endeavor. 
I am not sure if there is much more to be said other than that I fear the dismissal of the 
desire to explain these types might be too hasty. The market is an incredible web of complex 
interactions that should draw an awe equivalent to the one that astrophysicts feel when they look 
out into the universe. There is something immensely powerful about discovering some more 
fundamental truth about the types within this market web that makes me want to continue to dive 
deeper in search for them rather than settle for examining the individual tokens. 
Chapter 4 - Conclusion 
We have seen that the puzzle is not easily whisked away. We still have a single 
phenomenon, that firms price above marginal cost contra the implications of the perfect 
competition model, and two competiting explanations of that phenomenon, Cournot and 
Bertrand, that cannot both be true, yet are still both accepted as good explanations.  
In assessing the five possible solutions, it seems to be that the second and the fifth are the 
closest to how economists themselves have come to resolve this puzzle. If the second is that 
important, this could have an impact on our understanding of explanation. If it is the case that 
economists are willing to accept these two contradictory explanations, because of conflicting 
aims related to the two, then we have good reason to think that something more than simple, 
undifferientated truth plays an important role the economist’s assessment of the goodness of 
explanations. This is an interesting way that this puzzle shines light on questions about 
explanation. Could there be cases in other sciences where scientists are unable to decide between 
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explanations because of the incommensurability of their values? Is this a case unique to 
economics? If so, what does this mean for economics?  
If it is the fifth solution that offers our best way out, than we are left with other important 
questions about the field of economics. What does this mean about the ultimate aim of 
economics? Are we only to find answers for why-questions related to individual tokens? Do 
types not play an important explanatory role for the economist? If so, why not and is there a 
different group who should be assessing these issues?  
What one sees as the best response to the puzzle seems to open up other important 
questions about scientific explanation both in general and how it is accomplished by economics. 
Ultimately, just as Reiss said about his paradox, it seems that the most rational response to this 
puzzle is too remain baffled and search it out to discover new and interesting facts about the 
nature of explanation.  
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